On Trial: Supreme Court Ruling on Tamil Nadu Governor Redraws Boundaries of Federal Power

The Supreme Court바카라�s landmark verdict in the State of Tamil Nadu v the Governor of Tamil Nadu, delivered on April 8, 2025, lays down firm timelines for gubernatorial assent, invoking Article 142 to break the legislative deadlock. By asserting judicial review over high constitutional offices, the apexcourt has restored the balance in Centre-State relations and protected legislative sovereignty against procedural obstruction.

The Background

The Supreme Court바카라�s judgement marks a critical moment in the evolving landscape of Indian constitutional governance. It is a decision that not only redefines the procedural relationship between Governors and elected state governments but also speaks profoundly to the nature of democratic accountability within the Indian federal structure. The petition filed by the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK)-led Tamil Nadu government sought judicial intervention against what it described as the Governor바카라�s 바카라�calculated inaction바카라�바카라�a deliberate and prolonged refusal to act on 12 bills passed by the state assembly. Some of these bills had been pending for years; the earliest dating back to 2020. The inaction of the Governor, an unelected constitutional authority, effectively created a legislative paralysis, threatening the normal course of democratic functioning at the state level. It was only after a Supreme Court bench, comprising of then Justices D. Y. Chandrachud, J. B. Pardiwala and Manoj Mishra, took cognisance of the petition and issued a notice that the Governor belatedly returned 10 of the bills to the legislative assembly for reconsideration, while reserving the remaining two for Presidential consideration under Article 201 of the Constitution. Notably, the Governor returned the bills without recommending any specific amendments, a key constitutional requirement.

Subsequently, the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly re-enacted the 10 bills without any changes and presented it again to the office of the Governor for his assent. Rather than giving assent, as mandated under Article 200, the Governor reserved all 10 bills for Presidential consideration, citing their alleged 바카라�repugnancy바카라� to matters in the Union List of the Seventh Schedule. This act of the Governor marked a constitutional anomaly바카라�a Governor reserving re-passed bills, contrary to binding judicial precedent in the State of Punjab v Principal Secretary to

the Governor of Punjab (2024), which held that once the Governor withholds assent and the legislature re-passes the Bill, assent becomes mandatory.

The Court was faced with an unprecedented constitutional deadlock: a Governor using constitutional ambiguities to subvert, rather than facilitate, legislative functioning. In a far-reaching exercise of its inherent powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court ruled that the 10 bills must be deemed to have received assent on the very day they were resubmitted after reconsideration. The judgement is a watershed for Centre-State relations and significantly impacts the functioning of the Governor바카라�s Office across India. The guidelines, as laid down by the division bench

comprising Justices J. B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, shall be binding in all such future cases, where the Governor is found to

be obstructing the legislative process. Importantly, the ruling resonates beyond Tamil Nadu. Similar tensions are playing out in Kerala, Punjab, Telangana, West Bengal and Chhattisgarh, where state governments have accused Governors of stalling legislation, thereby undermining the democratic mandate. The State of Kerala바카라�s writ petition against its Governor is currently under consideration by a division bench comprising Justices P. S. Narasimha and Joymalya Bagchi. Thus, the verdict has come at a pivotal moment, reflecting a broader national concern about safeguarding the delicate balance of power between the Union and the States, as originally envisioned in India바카라�s federal Constitution.

Constitutional Text

The controversy fundamentally revolves around the interpretation of Articles 200 and 201 of the Indian Constitution, which outline the Governor바카라�s role when a bill is passed by the state legislature. Article 200 provides three choices to a Governor when presented with a bill: the Governor may grant assent; the Governor may withhold assent and return the bill to the legislative assembly for reconsideration, with a message suggesting specific amendments; the Governor may reserve the bill for the consideration of the President. Crucially, if a bill is returned to the legislature and is passed again without any changes, the Governor is duty-bound to assent. The use of the word 바카라�shall바카라� in this provision removes any discretionary leeway. In the case of Money Bills, the Governor has no power to return the bill for reconsideration at all. Article 201 comes into play when a bill is reserved for the President바카라�s consideration. Once a bill is reserved, the President may: grant assent; withhold assent; direct the Governor to return the bill to the assembly with a message suggesting amendments. Upon resubmission after reconsideration, the President must finally decide whether to assent or withhold assent. However, the Constitution does not prescribe specific timelines for either the Governor or the President to act, creating potential for indefinite delay바카라�an omission that has become a source of constitutional deadlock. Furthermore, Article 163 mandates that the Governor must act on the 바카라�aid and advice바카라� of the council of ministers, except in narrowly-defined discretionary matters. Similarly, Article 156 stipulates that the Governor holds office at the President바카라�s pleasure, emphasising that the Governor is an instrumentality of the Union, but must function within constitutional parameters. A proper interpretation of these provisions, therefore, dema­ nds a reading that ensures Governors act as facilitators of democracy바카라�not as centres of obstruction or parallel executive power. The Constituent Assembly debates also reflect this intent. B. R. Ambedkar, during the Constituent Assembly debates, had emphasised that the Governor바카라�s role would be largely ceremonial, akin to the President at the Union level, bound by ministerial advice and not an independent authority.

The Judgement

The Supreme Court바카라�s ruling in this case systematically addressed the constitutional dysfunction that had unfolded. Invoking Article 142 to 바카라�do complete justice바카라�, the apex court laid down the following binding procedural norms. First, a Governor must act either by granting assent, returning the bill, or reserving it for the President바카라�within one month of receiving a bill. Indefinite inaction is incompatible with constitutional democracy. Second, if the assembly re-passes the bill in the original form after reconsideration, the Governor must grant assent within a further period of one month. After this stage, reservation for Presidential consideration is impermissible unless substantial new amendments are introduced in the bill originally returned by the Governor to the legislature. Third, if reserving a bill, the Governor must record specific constitutional grounds in writing, highlighting any conflict with the Union List or fundamental constitutional provisions, which shall be subject to judicial review if challenged. Fourth, the options under Article 200, mentioned above, are to be exercised sequentially and exclusively. The Governor cannot withhold assent after reservation or vice versa unless substantial new factors emerge. Fifth, once a bill is reserved, the President must decide within three months. The President may seek the Supreme Court바카라�s non-binding advice under Article 143, but only in cases involving constitutional questions바카라�not routine policy matters. Sixth, both the Governor바카라�s and President바카라�s actions and inactions must be supported by reasoned orders subject to judicial review and issuance of the court directive, if necessary. In the extant case, the court found the Governor바카라�s conduct unconstitutional on several grounds: inordinate and unexplained delay; acting only after judicial notice; failure to specify reasons when returning the bills; and unlawful reservation of bills after re-passage. Perhaps the most novel aspect of the judgement is the application of the 바카라�deemed assent바카라� doctrine. By holding that the bills were deemed to have been assented on the date of re-presentation, the court ensured that legislative sovereignty cannot be indefinitely subverted by procedural sabotage.

The Discussion

The Tamil Nadu judgement raises fundamental debates about constitutional governance in India. First, it reopens the discussion about judicial propriety of two-judge benches deciding major constitutional issues. Article 145(3) of the Constitution requires that substantial constitutional questions should ideally be decided by a Constitution Bench comprising at least five judges. Critics have thus argued that norms affecting high constitutional offices like Governors and the President should ideally be settled by a larger bench. Second, concerns about the separation of powers have been voiced. By directing the President바카라�a constitutional head바카라�to act within timelines and to issue reasoned orders, the court has walked a fine line between necessary constitutional enforcement and potential overreach. Yet, as the court itself emphasised, constitutional offices cannot become zones of impunity. In B. P. Singhal v Union of India (2010), the court held that even the President바카라�s decision to remove a Governor was subject to judicial review. Thus, the notion that constitutional heads are beyond scrutiny has been long discredited. Third, critics have argued that prescribing timelines and detailed procedures amounts to judicial legislation, a function reserved for Parliament. However, the court바카라�s reliance on Article 142바카라�allowing it to 바카라�do complete justice바카라�바카라�is a recognised constitutional power, especially where constitutional silences are exploited to undermine democracy. The Vishaka Guidelines (1997) laid down workplace sexual harassment norms in a similar vacuum pending legislative action. Moreover, the Sarkaria Commission (1988) and the Punchhi Commission (2010) had, after extensive studies and wide consultation, recommended the establishment of time frames for gubernatorial action to prevent executive obstruction of the legislature. The court바카라�s decision thus operationalises long-standing expert consensus.

International and Historical Comparisons

Internationally, the Indian court바카라�s approach finds parallels in other Commonwealth democracies. In Australia and Canada, Governor-Generals and provincial Governors act almost entirely on ministerial advice. They are forbidden by constitutional convention from refusing assent to duly passed legislation. In the United Kingdom, though the monarch technically grants royal assent to laws, it is unthinkable under constitutional practice for the Crown to refuse assent to Parliament바카라�s bills. The last refusal occurred in 1708. Indian constitutional practice has drawn heavily from

these Westminster traditions. By insisting on the limited and ceremonial role of Governors, the Supreme Court aligns India바카라�s federal practice with the principles of democratic governance and responsible government. Importantly, the framers of the Indian Constitution, in the Constituent Assembly, repeatedly stressed that the Governor would not act as an agent of the Union government, but as a constitutional figurehead facilitating democratic processes at the state level.

The Way Ahead

The Supreme Court바카라�s verdict marks a pivotal development in Indian constitutional law. While triggered by a state-level legislative impasse, the ruling addresses larger concerns about the functioning of democratic institutions, the role of unelected constitutional authorities, and the preservation of federal balance. The judgement reaffirms a vital constitutional principle: in a parliamentary democracy, legislative will바카라�expressed through duly elected representatives바카라�must prevail over procedural inaction or discretion misused by constitutional heads. By laying down clear timelines and requiring reasoned decision-making, the court has fortified the legislative process against indefinite delays and opacity, bringing long-awaited clarity to Articles 200 and 201, which had often been exploited due to their silence on procedural timelines. In doing so, the court has echoed the recommendations of the Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions, which for decades urged the creation of objective timelines for gubernatorial assent. It also reinforced the constitutional expectation that Governors act on the aid and advice of the council of ministers, except in rare circumstances explicitly provided for. Yet, judicial correction alone is not sufficient. The judgement highlights the urgent need for structural reforms, especially around the appointment and tenure

of Governors. A more consultative, bipartisan process for gubernatorial appointments could enhance the neutrality and credibility of this high constitutional office. While some critics have raised concerns about judicial overreach, the court바카라�s use of Article 142 must be seen in the context of preserving democratic functionality. Where constitutional silences are manipulated to paralyse law making, judicial interpretation becomes a tool not of interference, but of institutional rescue. Ultimately, this ruling is more than a procedural clarification. It is a reaffirmation that constitutional posts exist to serve democratic processes, not to subvert them. As India바카라�s federal dynamics continue to evolve, this verdict stands as a precedent that constitutional morality and the sovereignty of elected institutions cannot be overridden by office-holders acting beyond their mandate. In restoring the primacy of the legislature, the Tamil Nadu judgement has ensured that democratic will cannot be stalled by constitutional ambiguity. It will remain a reference point for upholding the spirit of the Constitution, especially in moments when it is most under strain.

Ashutosh Kumar is Professor, Department of Political Science, Panjab University, Chandigarh

Shruti Bedi is Professor & Director, University Institute of Legal Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh