This book presents a wealth of detail, digging deep into the murky crypts of the RAW and ISI. In the final analysis, it바카라s inauthentic and unconvincing.
In 1928, legendary English writer W. Somerset Maugham described the nature of intelligence work as 바카라extremely monotonous, a lot of which is uncommonly useless바카라. He was writing the preface of his novel Ashendon or The British Agent on his involvement with British Intelligence during the First World War. Naturally, he had to present a 바카라fictionalised바카라 version in Ashendon.
Terrorism added a new dimension to intelligence, literature style, when publishers realised that a melange of horror and glamour was a perdurable commercial proposition. Bullets shattering champagne glasses under crystal chandeliers in luxury hotels provided dramatic effect, as in the widely-retailed 26/11 terror stories. Wanton killings of poor passengers in the railway station did not merit such attention.
Spy Stories by Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark, written in a Robert Ludlum genre, has received impressive publicity in mainstream Indian media. Almost every review has repeated the book바카라s blurb that the authors had 바카라unprecedented access to the R.A.W. and the ISI바카라. It is well researched, with copious notes on each piece of information presented.
This acclaim has made them a reference point here on the comparative capability of Indian and Pakistani intelligence systems, especially after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. As against this, I could not trace a single review in the Pakistani media.
The authors have said that senior Indian and Pakistani intelligence officers welcomed to being interviewed by them. They would tape over a hundred officers over a decade, with their interlocutors freely discussing the most sensitive aspects. Take for instance this sentence on Page xvii about an Indian officer, still in service: 바카라We satellited around him when he was undercover, and in recent years, more openly, to debate the past and the future, sharing a passion, especially for Southeast Asia and beyond바카라.
In India they spoke 바카라at length바카라 to six former heads of RAW and 바카라a clutch of senior officers바카라 at different levels as well as 바카라the founding figures in India바카라s strategic world바카라 serving in Prime Minister바카라s Office, Intelligence Bureau, Defence Intelligence Agency, Rashtriya Rifles and Border Security Force. Some of these very senior officers are named by them.
In Pakistan, they interviewed seven former ISI chiefs, their Joint Intelligence heads and deputy director generals and their support staff for the 바카라war on terror바카라 years, including ISI바카라s regional desk officers in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. They met the police, the judiciary, personnel from the Federal Investigation Agency and journalists. 바카라Major Iftikar바카라, who had participated in ISI바카라s 바카라most controversial operations바카라 and had left the service, was secretly met by them in Dubai doing 바카라export바카라 work after 바카라he had gone dark바카라 in 2011.
As a result, they could compile 바카라wish lists for both sides of the Line of Control (LoC)바카라 and 바카라wade through바카라 the world of clandestine operators, case officers, 바카라targeters바카라 and analysts. In that process, they became the 바카라Gavrilov바카라 channel between both services (Page 8). They claim twice in the book that the highest Indian security official, still in charge, 바카라had supported the idea of this book바카라.
A closer study would reveal doubts on these presumptuous claims. Firstly, Gavrilov was a direct link and not through intermediaries. In 1983 Anatoli Kireyev, chief of KGB바카라s Counterintelligence Directorate, proposed this idea to Burton Gerber, CIA바카라s Director of Operations at Geneva. However, it was neither useful for probing each other바카라s capability, to answer a query from India바카라s topmost official (바카라How was it over there바카라, page 7) nor as a crisis communications link.
Gavrilov failed in 1984, when CIA requested KGB to rescue their officer William Buckley, who was kidnapped by Islamic Jihad, over whom Soviets had influence. Buckley died in captivity. It again failed in 1985, when KGB requested CIA to trace out their officer Igor Ghezha, missing from India. The New York Times (March 25, 1985) explained the reason: Ghezha was given asylum in the US.
What was the secret of the authors바카라 success in penetrating strict protocol of secrecy by intelligence officers in both countries when they are legally barred in revealing any aspect of their working to outsiders, especially foreigners? Have they made this audacious claim knowing fully well that no serving or retired intelligence officer in India and Pakistan would comment in public on such claims?
This problem is manifest with 바카라Monisha바카라, their resolute contact in RAW, introduced on Page 14. Monisha appears during every crisis like an expert Lydian stone, be it on Sri Lanka, Pakistan or terrorism. The authors want us to believe that in RAW she handled most of the key operational assignments in all areas. This is not normal in any intelligence agency.
바카라Hazel-eyed바카라 and 바카라pale-skinned바카라, Monisha was 바카라located바카라 by them near Seattle after she had 바카라changed her name바카라 and left her service 바카라for personal and political reasons바카라. She asked them 바카라to switch to Wire, the same discreet Swiss app that Iftikar relied upon바카라 to communicate with them.
Monisha chose to serve in RAW in the early 1980s 바카라on a career that she was unable to talk about바카라. Yet what she did was to break all these taboos. She pops up again and again in the book till May 2016 (Page 242-43) while she was in service discussing landmark events on India바카라s crisis-borne relations with Sri Lanka or Pakistan. She finally left RAW in or around 2016, when she found her colleagues 바카라conspiring바카라 with politicians to create events or misconstrue them. 바카라This is not my vision of India or the RAW,바카라 she told the authors.
Her disenchantment started when she was not able to get 바카라traction바카라 in Lodhi Road on her conclusions over Mumbai 26/11 terror attack, although she had noted that CIA had passed on 18 advance alerts to RAW. This reference was picked up by some political groups in August 2021 to allege that the previous Congress government had ignored 18 detailed warnings from foreign agencies on 26/11.
However, this was public knowledge. FBI Director Robert Mueller had spoken to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) on February 23, 2009, about US intelligence contribution before 26/11. On November 9, 2009, I had given details of 26/11 intelligence while delivering the keynote address to the 2009 Asia Pacific Homeland Security Summit (Honolulu) in the presence of senior security officials. I had also published several columns on this throughout 2009.
Who was 바카라Monisha바카라? One hint the authors give is on Pages 25- 26 when they mention that she took a certain RAW chief (바카라operationally bold and analytically incisive바카라), who took charge in 1987, as her 바카라guide바카라. Monisha worked on 바카라critical thinking바카라 and visited Chennai for locating ISI footprints on Tamil regional politics.
It so happened that I had worked very closely with all the chiefs of RAW from 1976 till 1995. Especially from 1986 to 1990, I was the chief of staff to three RAW chiefs, including the 바카라operationally bold바카라 chief.
In 1987, a certain lady officer answering Monisha바카라s description was inducted. She was initially entrusted with a very minor part of the Sri Lankan desk for training, for which she had visited Chennai. However, she did it with unusual fanfare. In 1993, she had to be repatriated to her 바카라parent바카라 service on adverse behaviour. Yet in the book she was present till 2016, interpreting all the events, including 26/11.
The book would certainly entertain like the Bourne series, but does not serve as authentic intelligence history.
(The writer is a former special secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, who was part of the two-man high-level enquiry committee on the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks)