It was former US State Department officer Joseph V. Montville who had coined the word 바카라Track-II바카라 while writing in Foreign Policy (Winter-1981-82) on conflict resolution negotiations. He was defining attempts by non-official channels to find common ground that official negotiators (Track-I) could not. But Montville did not invent the process. President Dwight Eisenhower had used it through Norman Cousins, editor of The Saturday Review, to break a stalemate in negotiations with Soviet Union during the Gary Powers U-2 Spy plane incident (1960-62). Cousins had set up the 바카라Dartmouth Conference바카라 in 1960, assembling American and Soviet intellectuals for informal dialogue.
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But Montville did not consider 바카라Track-II바카라 as a substitute for 바카라Track-I바카라. The aim of both tracks is problem solving and not mere dialogue. Montville바카라s Track-II only provided a 바카라bridge바카라 to facilitate decisions through Track-I. He envisaged situations when 바카라people who have the trust of their groups바카라 could 바카라influence the top leadership바카라 of conflicting nations.
The book under review is a record of Track-II 바카라Intel Dialogue바카라 (intelligence dialogue) during 2016-2017 between former ISI Chief Gen. Asad Durrani (1990-92) and former RAW chief A.S. Dulat (1999-2000) in Istanbul, Bangkok and Kathmandu, moderated and recorded by senior journalist Aditya Sinha. It covers practically all facets of India-Pakistan issues, personal interpretations of both on bilateral and multi-lateral developments, including intelligence and their recommendations for the future.
However, neither Dulat nor Durrani could claim that they had the 바카라trust바카라 of their governments. This is not due to their fault but due to changed circumstances in their countries. Durrani had a reputation as a non-political intelligence chief who risked many bumps in his career, according to Hein G.Kiessling of the Ludwig Maximilian University, author of a history of the ISI (Faith, Unity Discipline바카라The ISI of Pakistan, 2016). The book is considered to be a semi-official account, as ISI had supplied official versions to the author.
Naseerullah Babar, a creator of the Taliban along with Col Imam
In 1988, Zia was so annoyed with Durrani for giving a lecture on democracy at the National Defence College that he blocked his promotion. In 1990, prime minister Nawaz Sharif reluctantly appointed him ISI chief, but removed him in March 1992. After the publication of the book under review, he has been called to order by his GHQ at the suggestion of Nawaz Sharif for violating the military code of conduct in airing views deemed against the official stand, especially the Abbottabad operation involving Osama bin Laden.
Dulat, who worked for long years on the Kashmir desk in the Intelligence Bureau, was a very successful RAW chief. In 2000, PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee chose him as adviser for the crucial Kashmir dialogue. Dulat reveals that it was his idea to suggest to the newly elected prime minister, Narendra Modi, to invite Nawaz Sharif for his swearing-in ceremony in 2014, as his contacts in Srinagar had suggested that 바카라he was keen to come바카라. He confirmed this through Durrani and passed it on to the new 바카라bigwigs바카라.
A typical Track-II should include the dialogue partners바카라 frank assessment of intentions, capability and vulnerability of both countries to allow people to judge, even in posterity, whether a real confrontation between them was in the offing. It is good that Durrani had revealed that there was no possibility of an India-Pakistan war when the 바카라Gates Mission바카라 in May 1990 had triggered fears of a nuclear confrontation. This was in the wake of a sudden spurt in the Kashmir insurgency, Pakistan바카라s Zarb-e-Momin exercises and India바카라s retaliatory action.
But Durrani is not as revealing on other issues, which had deeply disturbed India even when he was holding office. Kiessling wrote that Durrani headed the ISI (August 1990 to March 1992) during 바카라a period when Kashmir, Afghanistan and internal affairs were the ISI바카라s main concerns바카라. Yet he does not reveal how and why turbulence had suddenly burst open in Kashmir in December 1989, after Rubaiya Sayeed바카라s abduction just prior to his taking over as ISI chief.
Even the late Hamid Gul had frankly told the then RAW chief, A.K. Verma, in the 1980s, during their initial secret Track-I meeting in Amman, that Pakistan was backing Sikh terrorism as it was afraid of India. He said that they would stop supporting terrorism if India made enough movements towards confidence building measures (CBMs). On his part, he did make certain movements which had benefited India. That type of frankness was absent in Durrani. On May 5, 2011, he was quoted by Reuters as saying, 바카라Terrorism is a technique of war, and therefore an instrument of policy바카라. He had made the statement when the Guantanamo interrogation documents, connecting the ISI with terrorism, were leaked.
Although he denied ISI바카라s K-2 operation (Kashmir-Khalistan) as beyond Pakistan바카라s capability, he tells Dulat that 바카라this is not the right time to start playing the Sikh card, the Kashmir card, the ULFA card바카라, adding that the 바카라idea was to keep it on a leash바카라 as neither 바카라side바카라 wanted a war. He is also ambivalent on official Pakistani involvement in 26/11.
Durrani claims that no ISI man had 바카라defected바카라, like from RAW. Quite true. The last big defector, Rabinder Singh, could flee due to RAW바카라s own intransigence of not handing over the investigation to the IB. But then, no other official espionage agency has been in the swim with terrorists as the ISI. The classic example is ISI stalwart Col. Imam (Sultan Amir Tarar) who, along with Naseerullah Babar, had created the Taliban in 1994 with the help of then DGMO Pervez Musharraf, by giving them the entire Pakistani arms cache in Spin Boldak on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. RAW could monitor this development, taking advantage of an open conversation between President Farook Leghari and Babar. The same Col. Imam was brutally killed in February 2011 by Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Dulat should have asked Durrani how the ISI keeps the integrity of its cadre when faced with such dangerous elements.
Yet, the dialogue should be very interesting for Indian readers as we are yet to develop a culture of studying intelligence as a tool for formulating policy. Consequently, we have produced only motivated or vainglorious intelligence literature, fit for Bollywood thrillers. At the same time, their remarks on current decision makers or 바카라hawkish바카라 career foreign service officials (Part IV: Kabuki) might excite the media, but do not help either country in finding solutions.
A comparison with another book, jointly written by CIA-KGB operators, and moderated by a US journalist during the US-Russia bonhomie during the Yeltsin presidency (1991-1999), may be relevant. In 1997, Yale University managed to produce a mammoth book, Battleground Berlin-CIA Vs. KGB in the Cold War, jointly written by David Murphy (CIA) and Gen. Kondrashev (KGB), who were in charge of rival Berlin stations. Like Aditya Sinha, this dialogue was moderated and recorded by American journalist George Bailey.
The book reproduced 250 secret file extracts and 87 photocopies of original documents. For the first time, it was possible to compare both services together, how they worked and fought with each other. It divulged that the Soviet services had access to the 바카라highest reaches of the American, British and French governments바카라. It revealed how Gen. Donovan, father of American foreign intelligence, was deceived by NKGB in 1943 during the Second World War when he visited Moscow for proposing intelligence cooperation. Moscow happily agreed. What Donovan did not know was that his personal staff officer, Duncan Chaplin Lee, was already on the payroll of the NKGB!
Finally, the take-away: The Chronicles refer to Dulat and Durrani바카라s common paper on 바카라Intelligence Cooperation바카라 published in The Hindu and Dawn simultaneously (July 14, 2011). It recommends that both agencies should serve as 바카라back-channel바카라 for their governments to pave way for political dialogue. In Chapter 31, they have recommended the institutionalisation of ISI-RAW representatives바카라 meetings. Former Union home minister P. Chidambaram had tried this out in 2010.
This would be similar to the secret, deniable 바카라Gavrilov channel바카라, which CIA and KGB had established in the 1980s to set limits 바카라on certain extremes of behaviour by agreeing on unwritten rules of the game바카라.
(The writer is a former special secretary, Cabinet Secretariat)
