Reading A Force So Swift: Mao, Truman, and the Birth of Modern China, 1949 by author Kevin Peraino gives an idea of America바카라s China policy at the height of power after World War II.
While US leaders now consider China바카라s rise as a 바카라threat to the world,바카라 there were some reconciliatory voices within the US administration in 1949. They had no sympathy for Mao though. They believed that the Chinese will change the system themselves in the mainland. Among them was US President Harry S Truman. He had firm faith that 바카라Chinese people would eventually subvert communist rule바카라.
However, others like General Claire Chennault, the former commander of the Flying Tigers, thought the American 바카라wait and see policy바카라 would make Communist revolution spread throughout the wider region. To Frank Wisner, the head of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), the covert action arm of the post-war American intelligence apparatus, Chennault proposed a course to freeze Mao바카라s advance by 바카라arming provincial leaders who could create a belt of resistance바카라 around the Communist-controlled territories. Chennault, Peraino writes, 바카라was optimistic about the Muslim leaders in China바카라s northwest바카라 to halt Mao바카라s march.
In this gripping narrative, author Peraino takes you to 1949 China month by month and tells you how Mao was consolidating his position in China by pushing nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek from Nanjing to Shanghai and finally to Taiwan. He also write how Madam Chiang was desperately seeking help for her Nationalist forces while sitting in the United States and was sending coded telegram after telegram to her husband informing him of the results of about her efforts of seeking aid and sympathy at the same time. Chiang asked her to be more discreet in her cables.
Peraino tells us that Americans received Madam Chiang like a celebrity. Newspapers filled hundreds of columns with coverage of her speaking tour stops but President Truman was hard to conquer. He would complain to his advisors that any American assistance programme would be pouring 바카라sand in a rat hole.바카라 Though the Nationalist diplomats in the United States like Wellington Koo informed Truman that Nationalist forces near Changsha were fighting, Truman had 바카라nothing but disgust with Chiang and his allies as the Nationalist forces were collapsing before Mao바카라s PLA바카라.'
On June 22, 1949, when Chinese diplomats were sounding optimistic to Truman that Muslim troops fighting in the country바카라s northwest seemed to be slowing Mao바카라s advance, Stalin had other advice for Mao: 바카라Pay serious attention to Xinjiang, the home of China바카라s Muslim Uighur population, which the PLA had not yet subdued.바카라
Mao told Stalin that he thought any such operation would need to be postponed until the following year. But the author says the Soviet leader argued that Beijing should move more quickly as he believed that Xinjiang, rich in oil and cotton, could help revitalise the Chinese economy. Stalin would warn Mao that the delay would give chance to foreign powers like Britain to 바카라activate the Muslims, including the Indian ones, to continue the civil war against the communists바카라.
The US Ambassador to China Leighton Stuart was for reconciliation. But Mao wrote in an essay: 바카라All Chinese without an exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism바카라 and dashed Stuart바카라s hope. He wrote, 바카라You have to choose between the alternatives of either killing the tiger or being eaten by it.바카라
There are other minute details in the book like Stalin describing Mao as a 바카라margarine Marxist.바카라 While in Moscow waiting for a commitment of aid from Stalin, when Mao saw nothing was maturing, he told his travelling companions that he had not come all this way simply to 바카라eat, sleep and shit바카라.
Dean Acheson, the US Secretary of State, recalled his first hours in office: 바카라Chiang was in the last stages of collapse and I arrived just in time to have him collapse on me.바카라 Chiang Kai-Shek was to the director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter 바카라the joker throughout is the Generalissimo바카라.
The Generalissimo while fleeing Chongqing 바카라the last nationalist bastion바카라 cursed the Truman administration for not doing more to come to his rescue. He wrote in his diary on November 30, 1949: 바카라US China Policy is so unwise and so wrong that I worry about the security of the United States.바카라 For the US ambassador to India, Lord Henderson, Nehru was a 바카라vain, sensitive, emotional and complicated person.바카라 For Nehru, the menu in the US was 바카라long and exotic바카라.
Peraino writes that after the fall of Shanghai and Mao바카라s open declaration to align with the Soviets, George F Kennan, head of the Policy Planning Staff of the Truman administration, came up with a paper to extend the US 바카라policy of Communist containment to Asia바카라. America바카라s security, the paper바카라s authors had written, depended on the strength of a 바카라great crescent바카라 of friendly nations that surrounded the Middle Kingdom including India, Australia, the Philippines, and Japan. At times, you feel you are not in 1949 but 2023.
In early August 1949, Dean Acheson released a white paper on China titled United States relations with China, with special reference to the period 1944-49, subjecting Chiang Kai-Shek to strong criticism and arguing that the Guomindang leaders had proved incapable of meeting the crisis confronting them. Its troops had lost the will to fight and its government had lost popular support, said the paper, adding that the reasons for the failure of the Chinese Nationalists do not stem from any inadequacy of American aid.
Acheson, the author says, had no tolerance for 바카라cheap and cheerful universalism바카라 and hence believed in 바카라sort of a wait, look, see policy바카라 toward China.
The release of the white paper created an uproar with American Republican Congressman Walter Judd saying after viewing the document that 바카라Nationalist China바카라s record was not bad as I expected, while that of the American government is worse바카라. While Judd continue to see a remedy in Chennault바카라s plan to arm anti-Communist rebels in the mainland, Acheson remained unenthusiastic about the weapon shipment to the mainland, over or covert.
The Truman administration바카라s condemnation of Chiang did nothing to win Mao바카라s goodwill. In August, the Philippines President visited the United States and Mao in the summer of 1949 issued a rebuttal to the white paper. Picking from a line in the white paper that China바카라s history of 바카라democratic individualism바카라 would reassert itself soon on the mainland, Mao considered it as a veiled threat 바카라 a clear indication that U.S 바카라troublemaking would continue on the mainland.바카라
The Americans, Mao believed, would seek to recruit Chinese business leaders and intellectuals as they quietly worked to overturn his revolution. These Chinese 바카라middle-of-the-roaders바카라 might not like Chiang and his Nationalists, Mao wrote, but neither they were firmly behind his own regime. He worried that they are vulnerable to the 바카라honeyed words바카라 of the Western Leaders.
Fearing that after China, the countries 바카라like Burma, Thailand and Malaya바카라 would turn to Communism, Truman and his advisors looked towards the regional leaders. One of the most important figures was Indian Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. 바카라Proud and assertive바카라, Peraino writes, Nehru was conscious of India바카라s position and was less eager than his American counterparts to confront Mao directly. 바카라Although some in the Truman administration hoped that he (Nehru) would organise a regional block to oppose the Communists, he seemed more interested in conciliating Mao,바카라 says the author.
When Nehru visited Washington on October 11, 1949 for a three-week tour, he generated much excitement as would 바카라a motion picture star바카라. During the visit, the author writes, Nehru made it quickly clear that he was leaning toward recognising Mao바카라s new regime. The author writes that even Walter Judd, a cosmopolitan figure whose wife had been born and raised in India, seemed wholly unable to comprehend Nehru and his worldview. Peraino writes, 바카라While Nehru saw Mao바카라s victory as a manageable local headache, Judd viewed it as an imminent global threat.바카라
Walter Judd lived to witness the 바카라first twinklings of the PRC바카라s vertiginous economic ascent바카라 and felt betrayed by President Nixon바카라s opening to China. Even 1980s Judd was fulminating about the 바카라threats posed by the Beijing government바카라. In 1982, after an appearance on the television show Firing Line, Judd received a letter from a viewer, the 85-year-old Madam Chiang, praising him for his continued efforts. By the time the 20th century turned into 21st, Madam Chiang had celebrated her 100th birthday. Among the combatants of 1949, she survived and died at the age of 106 in 2003.
As rapid changes are taking place in the world with President Joe Biden바카라s national security strategy flagging China as a top threat and calling India a key partner, Peraino's book about diplomatic and battle events of 1949 China is fascinating. Stalin told Mao in their meeting that there would be no harm in keeping the Western powers on edge: 바카라One could create a rumour that you are preparing to cross the border and in this way frighten the Imperialists a bit.바카라 These days you don바카라t need to create rumours to get others frightened. You just fly a balloon and the world will be on the brink.
(Kevin Peraino's book A Force So Swift: Mao, Truman, and the Birth of Modern China, 1949 was published by Crown in 2017.)
