On 16 September 2022, a journalist broke the news from Kasra Hospital in Tehran that a 22-year-old Kurdish-Iranian woman named Jina Mahsa Amini had died as a result of injuries she had sustained while in police custody. Amini had been apprehended by Iran바카라s Guidance Patrol for a loosely fitted headscarf that showed what the state바카라s authorities deemed to be too much of her hair.
Amini바카라s death sparked a revolutionary uprising across and outside Iran at a scale seldom seen before. The very next day, her family and the women in attendance at her funeral in their hometown of Saqez in Kurdistan Province, removed their headscarves in protest chanting 바카라Jin, Jian, Azadi바카라 (Woman, Life, Freedom in Farsi) and 바카라Marg Bar Dictator바카라 (Death to the Dictator) as they marched down to the governor바카라s building. The protests soon spread to university campuses in Tehran.
The next few days we witnessed protests in big cities and metropolitan areas of the country as well as in smaller rural regions, led by young women and girls in their early and late teens as well as by marginalised ethnic and religious minorities, university students, struggling workers and the unemployed.
'Jin, Jian, Azadi'
The emphasis is on 'Jin, Jian, Azadi' (Kurdish for Woman, Life, Freedom) 바카라a call for ending the tyranny of compulsory second-class citizenship imposed on women in Iran, a call to end the policing of women바카라s bodies, and a call for universal political freedoms, the freedom to decide one바카라s dress, one바카라s way of life, one바카라s fate, and one바카라s government. It바카라s a struggle for autonomy, equality, and democracy.
Women have always played, and continue to play, an incredibly significant role in Iranian politics. We can trace modern feminist movements in Iran back to the time of the constitutional revolution at the turn of the 20th century. Unfortunately, it is between 1905-1911, during this revolution, that we see the beginnings of today바카라s gender apartheid system start to take hold. Prior to this development, the clergy was not involved in Iranian politics. They had had a broad base of support across the population but they weren바카라t a fixture within the political apparatus. It was during this period that a few concessions were offered in the clergy바카라s favor.
The most important of these was the enshrining of a national religion which meant that the clergy and the 바카라Ithna Ashari바카라 branch of Shia jurisprudence would gain control over the country바카라s family laws. Iranian women were active in, yet sidelined from, the very constitutional movement that they had helped to bring about, with women remaining the subjects of their fathers and husbands until they won suffrage in 1963.
It was also as early as 1907 that Iranian feminists undertook the difficult grassroots work of opening dedicated schools for young women and girls, and they saw quite a bit of success in their efforts, especially in the capital of Tehran. But they had to deal with obstacles and challenges from the male-dominated political apparatus. The monarch Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925바카라44), pursued an aggressive modernisation campaign that, by 1936, included the disastrous decision to politicise women바카라s bodies by outlawing the veil (or rossari). This conflicted with feminists바카라 efforts to educate young women and girls, especially those belonging to more traditional and religious families. Many of them pulled their daughters out of the same schools that the women had fought so hard to bring to fruition. This disastrous law also served as a crucial political precedent in that it politicised women바카라s bodies, with subsequent governments aiming to write their competing visions for modernity on and through women바카라s bodies.
After the 바카라Revolution바카라
The 1979 revolution greatly impacted gender rights and women바카라s liberties in Iran. First, it바카라s important to note that women were agents of the revolution, not its passive recipients. Women were very much at the forefront of the opposition to the tyranny of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the last Shah of Iran. They were in favor of a democratic revolution that would realise full citizenship for women together with substantive and equal rights. To understand women바카라s opposition to the monarchy, it is crucial to note that the Shah바카라s dictatorship had descended into an outright police state armed with a deadly secret police바카라 the SAVAK. The Shah바카라s rule had, in decades prior to 1979, effectively sidelined and silenced all independent voices within his own cabinet and administration, including prominent women바카라s voices. Worse yet, beginning in 1963, the Shah pursued an aggressive series of reforms often referred to as the 바카라White Revolution,바카라 which was essentially grafted onto the lives of a disenfranchised population.
The real tragedy is that these included a number of important gender reforms that the women바카라s movement had long been fighting for. Things such as progressive changes to the family laws, the right to vote, maternity leave, daycare provisions, legal, safe abortions and so on. But because these reforms were prematurely imposed onto a disenfranchised populace who had no political powers and were also fully divorced from feminists바카라 grassroots consciousness-raising efforts, the move backfired. By 1979, these reforms came to be associated with the Shah바카라s oppressive, brutal, and imperialist rule. So much so that it gave Ayatollah Khomeini, who returned from exile in 1979, the very ideological ammunition he needed to weave together his particularly misogynistic brand of theocratic populism.
This brings us to the third and final regime of the 20th century, that of the theocratic regime. It was born out of the popular revolution of 1979 but which was consolidated in favor of the clerics by way of a post-revolutionary coup. At this juncture, Khomeini, who had done nothing of substance to lay the groundwork for the revolution, stepped in at an opportune time, and masterfully weaved together a populist rhetoric against the Shah.
Khomeini바카라s rhetoric was that Iranian society had been subjected to imperialist domination, not in an economic or militaristic fashion, but in a cultural manner. Specifically, here we get the image of the 바카라Westoxified바카라 woman, the women of my mother바카라s generation wearing so-called western garb, who in his twisted worldview, were symptomatic of a 바카라societal disorder.바카라 And so, in Khomeini바카라s view, any popular anti-imperialist revolution, such as what we witnessed in 1979, had to put the Iranian woman in her 바카라place바카라. And this is a very rigid place determined by the vision of a handful of clerics. This is why the constitution that Khomeini devised spelled out the different roles of women in the preamble. There are no such roles defined for men in the 1979 constitution.
My sense is that the reality for many of these different constituencies across Iran바카라an intersectional contingent of women, workers, students, and ethnic minorities바카라the killing of Amini embodied the kind of oppression and violence they had experienced at the hands of the current regime. Each of these constituencies sees a bit of themselves in Amini바카라s tragedy. Suffice to say that it rightly hit home for a broad swathe of the populace, whether they identified as women or as Kurds in Iranian society.
There is no doubt that the uprising has the Iranian government worried. From my last count, at least 160 cities and towns across all 31 of Iran바카라s provinces have seen crowds of defiant protesters take to the streets. Despite harsh internet shutdowns, mobile app censorship and bandwidth throttling, we바카라ve seen hundreds of videos emerge of unarmed protesters staring down militarised riot police while burning headscarves and calling for an end to the Islamic Republic.
(As told to Rakhi Bose)
(This appeared in the print as "Resistance Street")
Sara Hassani is an Iranian-Canadian professor, currently teaching Women바카라s and gender studies at Providence College, USA